INTRODUCTION
The smart card market is expanding rapidly as a result of its superior security, reliability, and capacity. Its ability to carry intelligent applications on the card such as "access", "credit/debit", "electronic cash", etc. gives the smart card an expanding market. The smart card provides distributed processing power, a computer in your wallet.
Smart card has effective card authentication and verification methodologies, employing cryptographic techniques. Smart card can be authenticated in one of two ways either Static or Dynamic:
1. Using Static authentication the smart card sends the terminal a "digital signature" containing information which uniquely identifies the card e.g., card serial number, manufacture ID and manufacture date. The terminal will decrypt the signature to determine if the card is genuine 2. Using Dynamic authentication the terminal will generate some random data, known as seed, and will ask the smartcard to encrypt the data. On receipt of the encrypted data the terminal will decrypt the data. If the decrypted data is the same as the seed then the card is genuine. Dynamic authentication is only possible with smartcards due to their ability to perform cryptography.
As card industries move from magnetic strip cards to smart cards, ability to process information on the cards drastically increases. In the case of magnetic strip card, it is imperative to rely on the host system's intelligence to authorize the transactions (e.g., credit/debit) since it has no information processing capability of its own. As we move to smart card, the intelligence doesn't have to be concentrated on the host system, but it can be moved from the host system to more balanced combination of host and smart card itself.
DISTRIBUTED INTELLIGENCE ON SMART CARD AS RISK MANAGEMENT TOOL
Security and risk management are integral parts of development and deployment of "risk managed" smart card application for a global electronic cash payment such as Mondex electronic cash. There are three critical components, --prevention, detection, and containment, --to achieve balanced risk managed smart card application. The security is primarily concerned with "prevention."
The risk management is primarily concerned with "detection" and "containment" in the event that the security were to be broken. The discussion of security can be found in [Maher, 1997] .
The objectives of smart card electronic cash risk management can be summarized as follows:
• To contain the economic risk exposure to a predetermined level, and
•
To ensure the stability and continuity of the product.
One of the key economic risk exposures is due to "counterfeit" of electronic currency. Among other things, the security and risk management is designed to address this threat head�on to minimize the impact of such attacks. At the same time, it is designed to ensure the stability and continuity of the product.
More specifically, to accomplish smart cart electronic cash risk management objectives, risk management strategy can stand on the four pillars:
Each pillar has its unique contribution to the objectives, but when they are balanced and combined, they become a formidable structure to base the risk management strategy, and to accomplish the objectives. It may seem obvious, but the prudential risk management is essential to the success of the product. It includes corporate governance and structural control. It is the foundation for the rest of the risk management is build onto.
One of the fundamental strategies in smart card electronic cash risk management such as Mondex is to economically exploit the on-chip data processing power of the smart card to the maximum extent. By installing risk management functionality on a chip, some of the critical risk management tasks are performed at the time of transaction autonomously on the transacting smart cards. On-chip risk management functionality includes both on-chip detection, and on-chip incidence response. On-chip incidence response can be activated autonomously, or by the central command.
There's a paradigm shift in off-chip (i.e., host system based) risk management as well. It partly relies on the on-chip intelligence to collect information selectively.
At the same time, a multi-layered off-chip monitoring and detection capability is deployed to analyze possible counterfeit activities. All the on-line transactions can be monitored, and some of the off-line transactions are selectively monitored.
Since counterfeit activities on electronic cash purses/cards are non-existent, Micro Dynamic Simulator was developed to simulate the impact of various counterfeit scenarios on the electronic cash economy for Mondex. It allows us to evaluate the effectiveness of the on-chip detection, the on-chip incidence response, and off-chip detection systems. It also generates data sets to create off-chip detection models. As we succeed in risk management, counterfeit transactions won't be available. The evaluation of new enhancement to on-chip functionality and the re calibration of off-chip detection models have to come from simulator using real market inputs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes Mondex global electronic cash payment scheme to set 1he stage.
Section 3 discusses the distributed intelligence -on-chip risk management capability on the smart card as an example of such intelligence.
Section 4 discusses the micro dynamic simulation. Section 5 discusses the quantification of impact of counterfeiter's threat scenarios using micro dynamic simulator. Section 6 discusses the effectiveness of off chip, host system based counterfeit detection systems.
Section 7 summariz es the discussion.
GLOBAL SMART CARD BASED ELECTRONIC CASH PRODUCT
The global smart card based electronic cash product such as Mondex electronic cash has the security and the risk management to prevent, detect, contain, and recover from potential counterfeit activities.
It is designed to make counterfeiter's "chain" of tasks as difficult as possible in every step of the way [Ezawa et al. 1998 ].
The product is designed for the efficient electronic cash payment transactions. It performs purse (chip) to purse (chip) transactions without central authorization. It has many on-chip capability and features such as physical security, cryptographical security, purse class structure (i.e., it restrict the interactions of different type of purses), purse limit, on-chip risk management capability (e.g., credit turnover limit), and migration1• Purse class structure, purse limit, credit turnover limit will be revisited in the following section. Ideally, an advanced smart card based electronic cash scheme, as a substitute for "real" money, should parallel the existing money supply and banking system. For the central agent to make a decision, it needs a database of a year or two worth of these transactions. It is truly requires substantial investment to perform this task in near real-time basis. For a micro payment scheme, it is difficult to see the cost/benefit justification when we have the alternative method.
The on-chip risk management capability is protected by the chip (tamper resistant). To disable its capability, it has to pass the layers of the security of the chip.
One of the critical elements and advantages of the on chip risk management capability is that it continuously functions even under complete physical security breakdown. Yes, it is true that the risk management functionality of the compromised chip will be disabled.
But for the counterfeiters to benefit from their activities, i.e., to obtain economic gain, they need to interact w _ ith other legitimate purses (cards) which still have ac��e and functioning on-chip risk management capabthty which are unique to each purse. Its wide range of functionality is discussed in the next subsection, but it is a formidable tasks tq pass all the screens without triggering some actions on the on-chip risk management part.
Lastly, it is more cost effective to invest in on-chip risk management functionality than that of off-ch1p (host) risk management infrastructure to perform the same functionality. Although risk management must invests in the off-chip (host based) risk management detection, not to duplicate the functionality of on-chip, but to complement. Each has unique capability to co � tribute to the overall risk management. Off-chip nsk management discussion can be found in [Ezawa, et. al. 1999 ).
DISTRIBUTED INTELLIGENCE PORTFOLIO-ON-CIDP RISK MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO
There are two primary methods for fraud and counterfeit detection in general, one measures the "velocity" of transactions, and the other compares transactions against "statistical signature" of the purse.
It is true for both on-chip and off-chip (i.e., host system based) detection. 
ON-CHIP INCIDENCE RESPONSE
As we discussed, the on-chip risk management has on chip incident response capability in an autonomous mode. Alternative approach to the counterfeit contingency is at the chip level by a central command to activate on-chip incidence response on a contaminated segment of purses (cards.) Once it activated, it will function autonomously without outside intervention (i.e., host systems). It is the fastest way to respond to the potential incident. "Simulator" node allows us to defme the simulation property, such as duration, starting date, etc. "MXICA"
represents "Certificate Authority" node, and allows us to send C3 commands, ''value creation", etc.
"Originator" node controls the circulation of the currency in the simulated territory (e.g., country). The simulated diffusion of the counterfeit value and an effectiveness with which it can be detected and contained provide the critical information that allows us to quantify a threat scenario in question.
We briefly described the micro dynamic simulator under development. This simulator can provide quantitative information to analyze the effectiveness of on and off chip risk management schemes. It will be also useful for recruiting new members, satisfying fmancial authorities, as well as existing members by demonstrating and quantifying the security and risk management issues.
EVALUATION
We evaluated the above mentioned detection systems in the "Street Comer Counterfeit Value Distribution
Threat Scenario" that is discussed in [Ezawa, et a/., 1998 ].
This is still a preliminary result. This counterfeit threat scenario assumes that the counterfeiters will sell, at a discount, counterfeit electronic cash to a fraudulent population, in exchange for "real" local currency. The fraudulent population is defmed as the one that would engage in such transactions knowingly and willingly. The fraudulent population is not necessarily as loyal as agents of counterfeit organization and the "secret" is bound to be leaked to the law enforcement institutions or electronic cash issuing institution.
It showed that this is quite a difficult task to carry out fl awlessly. For the sake of the evaluation of on-chip risk management capability, we assumed the following:
• Counterfeit organization has a well fmanced, well established world wide network, and a large number of dedicated agents in place.
• It successfully broke the security of the chip I purse application on the smart card that required a complete secrecy over an extended period of time while various tasks are performed to break security.
• It created a counterfeit electronic cash application --"shrink wrap" product of "golden goose" that can generate counterfeit electronic cash with flawless imitation of electronic cash application (e.g.,
Mondex purse) functionality.
• It established counterfeit value distribution channels with no "informants".
• Counterfeiter/agents can correctly identify
"fraudulent" population who is willing to buy counterfeit values with discount. They never make mistakes. If they approach a normal/honest person, he or she might inform the fmancial institution or authority.
COUNTERFEIT A'ITACK SCENARIO
Simulation model was set to run 180 days and the counterfeit attack starts at the last 6 days. The length of the run is set so that simulation transaction data will provide significant amount of normal transactions. One the first day of the attack, April I, 1998, the counterfeiters inject a very small amount of counterfeit value to the electronic cash economy to test the system.
On the second day, April 2, 1998, they inject amount they desire. On the third day, April 3, they stop their activities completely to observe and evaluate their performance of the previous day. They resume the counterfeit value distribution for the rest of the three days. Note that the calendar days are important, since the simulator simulates the day of the week, the seasonality and holiday impacts to the behaviors of various consumer and merchant segments.
RESULTS
In this section, we show the effectiveness of credit turnover limit only. Due to security reasons, although the central command based security renewal and dynamic re-custornization are found to be very effective, the discussion is omitted.
Automatic Response -Credit Turnover Limit
Figure 4 in the Appendix shows the impact that counterfeit activities have on the number of locked up purses. This is the direct effect of the on-chip risk management functionality. The locked up purses are the legitimate ones used by fraudulent population that happen to be contacted by the counterfeit purses in order to receive the created counterfeit value. When a preset condition is met, the on-chip risk management functionality turns on on-chip response autonomously in this case locking up the purses. It turned out that almost all the fraudulent purses were locked up due to the credit turnover limit and forced them to visit member (bank) for re-customization (resetting of on-chip logic).
Member can retrieve the information on the locked purse and can determine that possible counterfeit activities are in present.
6 OFF-CHIP, HOST SYSTEM BASED COUNTERFEIT DETECTION
Off-chip, host system based counterfeit detection systems complements the detection of counterfeit activities based on on-chip risk management capability.
There are four monitoring systems in the Mondex electronic cash scheme, two (i.e., currency and member monitoring systems) reside in the originator monitoring over a country or a territory, and another two (i.e., merchant and consumer monitoring systems) reside in the issuing members (banks).
In the following we show sample performance of two (currency and merchant monitoring systems) based on this attack scenario.
CURRENCY MONITORING SYSTEM
The objective of currency monitoring system is to detect the presence of potential counterfeit value in (almost) real time for the three types of attacks; rapid (i.e. a sudden redemption of counterfeit value), moderate, and long term (skimming). And to provide
recommendations as to what steps should be taken to identify sources for the potential counterfeit value, once detected.
The methodology of detecting the potential counterfeit value rests on the fact that any injection of counterfeit value into the Mondex economy will be eventually deposited with the originator and redeemed for "regular" money. Consequently, an unusual surge in the redeemed electronic cash value should be carefully scrutinized. We discussed the risk management of smart card based electronic cash industry and a method to evaluate the effectiveness of distributed intelligence function called "on-chip risk management" of the smart card for the global electronic cash payment application using micro dynamic simulation. We found that it is critical to evaluate the distributed intelligent capability quantitatively using micro dynamic simulation. We demonstrated the effectiveness of distributed intelligence -credit turnover limit to be very effective in detecting and containing counterfeit activities. We showed examples of detection capability of off-chip, host based counterfeit detection systems based on the micro dynamic simulation model generated data set, and found to be very effective. 
